This work explores the extent to which LSB embedding can be made secure against structural steganalysis through a modification of cover image statistics prior to message embedding. Natural images possess symmetries that are expressed through approximately equal cardinalities of certain sets of ktuples of consecutive pixels. LSB embedding disturbs this balance and a k th -order structural attack infers the presence of a hidden message with a length in proportion to the size of the imbalance amongst sets of k-tuples. To protect against k th -order structural attacks, cover modifications involve the redistribution of k-tuples among the different sets so that symmetries of the cover image are broken, then repaired through the act of LSB embedding so that the stego image bears the statistics of the original cover. To protect against all orders up to some order k, the statistics of n-tuples must be preserved where n is the least common multiple of all orders ≤ k. We find that this is only feasible for securing against up to 3 rd -order attacks (Sample Pairs and Triples analyses) since higher-order protections result in virtually zero embedding capacities. Securing up to 3 rd -order requires redistribution of sextuplets: rather than perform these 6 th -order cover modifications, which result in tiny embedding capacities, we reduce the problem to the redistribution of triplets in a manner that also preserves the statistics of pairs. This is done by embedding into only certain pixels of each sextuplet, constraining the maximum embedding rate to be ≤ 2/3 bits per channel. Testing on a variety of image formats, we report best performance for JPEG-compressed images with a mean maximum embedding rate undetectable by 2 nd -and 3 rd -order attacks of 0.21 bits per channel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hiding secret messages in the least significant bits of pixels in digital images is the oldest steganographic technique. It follows a simple rule: to embed a message bit into a pixel of value x, flip the pixel's least significant bit (LSB) to match the message bit, flip(x) =
x + 1 for x even x − 1 for x odd.
The beauty of this technique is the simplicity of message retrieval: one needs merely to read off the LSBs of the pixels (perhaps scrambled in some way) to obtain the hidden message. No special software or complex operations are needed.
Since only the LSBs of only some pixels are modified, LSB embedding is also virtually impossible to detect visually. Alas, it does tend to affect pixel value statistics in an idiosyncratic way: even-valued pixels only ever increase by one, and oddvalued pixels only ever decrease by one. This asymmetry has given rise to a barrage of steganalytic attacks over the last two decades, starting in 2000 with the histogram attack [1] which Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD 20723 seeks to detect LSB embedding by examining the extent to which neighboring bins in the image's pixel value histogram tend to equality as a result of this embedding asymmetry. This attack only works well for high embedding rates, and so new techniques looking for changes in higher-order statistics, like correlations among neighboring pixel values, were developed [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] . These powerful methods are generally referred to as structural steganalysis, because they target the statistical properties of image structures (like pixel pairs, triplets, and so on). The most sensitive attacks in this family are able to detect embedding rates as low as 3% [6] , and are more accurate than other prominent attacks against LSB embedding [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] for certain image formats, like JPEG-compressed images.
A small change to the embedding rule-one that does not exhibit the asymmetry of Eq. (1)-greatly enhances the security of LSB steganography. LSB matching [14] , in which pixel values are randomly changed by ±1 so that their LSBs match message bits, has been widely explored as an equally elegant, greatly more secure alternative to LSB embedding. LSB matching has been paired with encoding schemes [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] to reduce the number of modified pixels, and adaptive embedding strategies which select pixels for modification that minimize some measure of distortion [19] , [20] , [21] . Distortion measures derived from features in the frequency and wavelet domains have led to some of the most secure algorithms, including Wavelet Obtained Weights (WOW) [22] , Spatial-Universal Wavelet Relative Distortion (UNIWARD) [23] , and the Multivariate Gaussian Model of [24] .
With more sophisticated steganography came more sophisticated steganalysis. In recent years, powerful, high-dimensional blind steganalytic techniques [25] , [26] , [27] , [28] based on machine learning [29] , [30] , [31] have begun to gain some inroads against even these algorithms. The machine learningbased technique of [32] built on features derived from the co-occurrences of neighboring noise residuals, attacks LSB embedding and performs better than the traditional, targeted approaches discussed above. But, the improved accuracy of these methods comes at the cost of increased computational overhead in terms of feature selection and engineering, and model training. Traditional attacks like structural steganalysis therefore remain popular and efficient options for first-line defense against LSB embedding.
Despite the greatly improved security offered by modern methods, LSB embedding remains widely used. It is found in a great number of open source and commercial data hiding products [32] ; it is simple enough to be implemented with an 80-character Perl code at the Linux command-line [6] . Just arXiv:2003.03658v1 [cs.CR] 7 Mar 2020 as little effort is required of the recipient in extracting the message. This is not the case with the most secure adaptive methods, which require relatively complex software routines, more computational time, and in many cases additional secret data for complete message extraction. Due to its continued relevance, there has been some effort in recent years to improve the security of LSB embedding against some of the more successful traditional attacks [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] . These efforts have primarily targeted the RS [2] and Sample Pairs analysis (SPA) [3] , [4] , and have generally sought to evade them by preserving the image statistics they target either by manipulating them prior to or after embedding, or via embedding strategies that preserve them in place. We will discuss these works in detail in the next section, but their primary deficiency is that most fail to protect LSB embedding from higher-order structural attacks, like the Triples analysis of [7] based on the statistics of pixel triplets. Triples analysis can accurately detect low-to-moderate embedding rates, and, of the traditional steganalytic techniques against LSB embedding, it performs best against certain image types, like JPEG-compressed raster images. Those approaches that do appear to offer such higher-order protections (like [35] , [37] ) either create additional statistical artifacts that could be attacked, or require considerable supplemental private data for successful message extraction.
In this work, we seek a means of securing LSB embedding against higher-order structural steganalysis, including both SPA and Triples analysis, that 1) does not produce unintended statistical artifacts, 2) does not require significant additional secret data for message recovery, and 3) preserves the computational and algorithmic simplicity of LSB embedding.
Structural steganalysis is based on the idea that the cardinalities of certain sets of consecutive pixel groups (pairs, triplets, etc) should be approximately equal for natural images, but diverge in an idiosyncratic way under LSB embedding. Structural attacks analyze the count statistics of these pixel groups and render an estimate of the hidden message length in proportion to this divergence. In this work, we consider cover modification, in which pixels groups are redistributed in the cover image in such a way that their count statistics return to normal after LSB embedding. With apparently normal set cardinalities, structural analyzers will be fooled into concluding that no hidden message is present. This kind of cover modification was presented as a defense against SPA in [40] , and we extend it here to include Triples analysis. This extension is not straight-forward: to protect against all orders up to some order k, the statistics of n-tuples must be preserved, where n is the least common multiple of all orders up to and including k. We find that cover modifications in terms of sextuplets, required to preserve the statistics of both pairs and triplets, are highly constrained and result in cover images with virtually zero embedding capacity. We demonstrate how to instead perform cover modifications at third-order, which is much less constrained, by redistributing triplets in such a way that also preserves the statistics of pairs. The trade-off is that only certain pixels in the image can be embedded.
We test this method against a range of different image types and find that we can achieve maximum undetectable embedding rates of 0.12, 0.17, and 0.21 bits per channel for uncompressed grayscale, uncompressed color, and JPEGcompressed color raster images. We also argue that extending protections to higher-order (quadruples analysis [41] ) is only possible at the cost of virtually zero embedding capacity; however, such detectors are difficult to implement in practice.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II explores related prior art on the subject of improving the security of LSB embedding against structural steganalysis, and Section III reviews the family of structural steganalysis techniques. In Section IV, we introduce the procedure of cover modification as it is used to secure LSB embedding against SPA in [40] , with some new elements necessary for extending it to higher-order. Section V develops the new cover modification procedure to protect against both second-and third-order structural attacks, and presents results of testing on a data set of grayscale and color images. In Section VI we discuss the possibility of extending this methodology to higher-order, and in Section VII we conclude.
II. RELATED WORK
Due its simplicity, there has been much work on improving the security of LSB embedding against the ever-escalating wave of steganalytic attacks. These approaches evade statistical attacks focused on image structures by preserving these statistics during the embedding process. There are three broad approaches to this problem: embedding strategies, in which LSB embedding is only performed on subgroups of pixels that preserve certain statistics; statistical restoration, in which portions of the cover image are altered after LSB embedding to recover certain statistics of the cover image; and cover modification, in which the cover image is altered prior to embedding so that the stego image retains certain statistics of the cover image. Some methods incorporate more than one of these aspects. We review several relevant works in this section.
The earliest approaches attempted to circumvent histogrambased attacks. In the work of [42] , the histogram is preserved by encoding the message such that the probabilities of 1's and 0's in the message are precisely those required to keep the frequencies of adjacent bins unchanged. Some protection against second-order statistics is conferred if the pixel pairs are chosen such that their frequencies in the image co-occurrence matrix are unchanged after the embedding; however, this method is not protective against second-order attacks like RS analysis [43] . This procedure is only applicable for high embedding rates, since otherwise the histogram attack is not particularly effective. In [44] , the histogram-preserving data mapping introduced under the assumption that pixels are i.i.d., embeds data with the same distribution as the cover image histogram so as to minimize their relative entropy. The i.i.d. assumption is in general not true for natural images, however, and so this method is susceptible to higher-order structural attacks, e.g. as shown in [45] .
The LSB+ method of Wu et al. [33] also seeks to preserve the pixel value histogram by compensating for bits embedded into a given pair of neighboring bins by appropriately changing the values of other pixels from these bins reserved for this purpose. To protect against second-order attacks, like SPA, only restricted groupings of pixels are embedded so that these statistics too can be preserved; the result is that test images had a very low average embedding capacity of around 2.5%. Protection against higher-order statistics would result in even lower embedding capacities. An improvement in capacity is offered by [34] but this method is equally susceptible to higher-order structural steganalysis.
With the increasing use of the powerful SPA technique, steganographers recognized the need to go beyond the preservation of first-order image statistics. In [35] , an inverse histogram transformation is applied to the cover image prior to embedding. This operation compresses the range of pixel values in the cover image, essentially coarse-graining the image prior to embedding. Since structural attacks like RS and SPA rely primarily on trace sets with small differences among neighboring pixels, as these are the most common pairs, the method of [35] is able to defeat these attacks for a wide range of embedding rates. To recover the hidden message, the recipient must reverse the compression. The trouble with this method is that the compression transformation eliminates entire pixel values from the stego image, which appear as empty bins in the image histogram. Analysis of the histogram enables one to reverse the transformation and then directly analyze the LSB-embedded image. Lou and Hu [36] correct this problem by performing multiple transformations with different parameters on different pixel groups of the cover, with the result that the combined histogram has no missing levels. Depending on the pixel grouping strategy, the authors of [36] acknowledge that this approach could be susceptible to a brute force attack wherein the steganalyst examines the histograms of many different pixel groups looking for evidence of missing levels. As the number of pixel groups grows, such that the histograms contain ever fewer pixels, missing levels could occur naturally and the authors argue that in this case there are insufficient histogram statistics to support steganalysis. This claim, however, remains to be validated in general.
An interesting example of statistical restoration is provided by the method of dynamic compensation [37] . Here the message is embedded and the values of half of the image pixels are increased by one. This has the effect of essentially "resetting" the statistics of the stego image, and structural steganalysis is unable to detect any hidden messages. The pixels used for this compensation must generally be chosen dynamically such that detection by common structural attacks is minimized. The main drawback of this method is that message retrieval requires a reversal of this compensation procedure, and so the locations of all modified pixels must be communicated to the recipient. This is a sizable amount of data: for a 512x512 image, this amounts to a 300kB secret key that must be securely exchanged along with the image. A related approach was explored in [38] where half of the image LSBs are flipped after embedding so that SPA and RS tests are fooled into concluding that images are maximally embedded regardless of the true embedding rate. While indeed these tests are in error, it is not clear how this result safeguards the stego image since such a detection would likely arouse suspicion that the image was either fully LSB embedded or had at least been tampered with. Further, message extraction requires knowledge of which LSBs were flipped so that the this operation can be reversed.
An approach that combines cover modification with an embedding scheme based on the eight-queens problem is presented in [39] . Here, each LSB is flipped or not according to whether its pixel, when taken as part of an eight-pixel block, is masked by one of the 92 eight-queens solutions. A group of pixels is reserved to restore set cardinalities to approximate those of the cover so that SPA is unable to detect the message. A general upper bound on embedding capacities is not established in [39] , but sample images are tested up to relative payloads of 30%. This is lower than the cover modification technique of [40] , discussed below, and similarly does not protect against higher-order attacks. It should also be noted that message extraction using eightqueens encoding is greatly more complicated than simple LSB embedding, and does not confer additional security against structural steganalysis.
Most recently, the work of [40] considers cover modification where the cardinalities of sets analyzed by SPA to detect the presence of LSB steganography are adjusted prior to message embedding such that the relevant second-order statistics are preserved in the process. This approach successfully protects against SPA at the cost of lower embedding capacities, upwards to around 50% on average [40] . Though second-order statistics are carefully preserved in this method, higher-order statistics can still be targeted by Triples analysis to uncover the hidden message length.
III. STRUCTURAL STEGANALYSIS
Structural steganalysis refers to a family of techniques that seek to detect hidden messages in spatial domain images by analyzing the statistical properties of contiguous groups of pixels. These methods have had good success detecting randomized LSB embedding at even low embedding rates.
A. First-order Attacks
First-order statistics, like frequency counts of pixel values, were the basis of the early histogram-based attacks. Often referred to in the literature as the histogram attack, the approach of [1] employs a χ 2 test to determine whether the tendency of LSB embedding to even-out the counts of consecutive even-odd pixel values can be distinguished from the histograms of typical cover images. The histogram attack is particularly useful against serially embedded messages, but is only effective against randomized embedding when the relative payload is high, around 1 bit/pixel. The trouble is that firstorder statistics vary considerably from image to image, and so it is difficult to ascertain whether an image with nearly equal numbers of even-odd pixel values is hiding data, or whether it just looks that way naturally.
Also based on the image histogram, the work of [46] modeled LSB steganography as additive noise and observed that the smoothing-out of neighboring histogram bins observed in [1] could be quantified in terms of the center of mass of the histogram characteristic function. In [46] , this attack was only tested on a few color images at full embedding capacity, and so its performance against lower rates has not been carefully studied. Absent good models of first-order statistics for natural images, we expect this method to likewise struggle to detect lower embedding rates.
B. Second-order Attacks
Sample pairs analysis (SPA) [2] , [3] , [4] , [6] considers the second-order statistics of natural images, and is based on the premise that natural images of objects with continuous shading should exhibit fairly small differences between neighboring pixels, and, for a given pair of such neighboring pixels, (u, v), we should just as readily expect u < v as v < u. This assumption is based on the expectation that natural images have no preferred direction of gradient. It is further supposed that this parity between pairs with u < v and v < u should hold regardless of whether u or v happens to even or odd. It can be shown that LSB embedding spoils this parity in a distinctive way, and SPA was developed to translate these observed parity deviations into an estimate of the hidden message length.
We define a sample pair as a doublet of neighboring pixels (x 1 , x 2 ), where each pixel (or channel for color images) takes on a b-bit value (typically b = 8 bits). All the pairs in an image form a multiset 1 , P. Interestingly, LSB embedding does not change the value
All such pairs form the trace set,
Further, a particular pair (x 1 , x 2 ) falls into one of two different subsets, where we use the concise notation of Ker [7] :
The trace set C m contains the four subsets: E 2m , O 2m−1 , E 2m+1 , and O 2m . Now, the trace set C m is closed under the action of LSB embedding, and so we expect the number of pairs in C m of the cover to be the same as the number of pairs in the stego image, C m , that is, |C m | = |C m |, where vertical bars indicate the cardinality of the set. However, the trace subsets are not closed under LSB embedding, with transitions occurring according to the diagram in Figure 1 . The subsets transform under LSB embedding according to,
where a = p, b = 1 − p, and p is the probability that the LSB of a single pixel is changed. The quantity E(|E 2m |) is the expectation value of the cardinality of the set E 2m after LSB embedding; it is a random variable because the embedding process is probabilistic. In what follows, though, we will assume that the measured values of these sets are close to the expectations and simply write | · | in place of E(| · |). In terms of the above sets, the SPA 2 cover image assumption can be written simply as |E 2m+1 | = |O 2m+1 |; it is clear from looking at Figure 1 that this condition will in general fail to hold under LSB embedding. For example, LSB embedding changes the cardinalities of the subsets E 2m+1 and O 2m+1 according to
In general, we therefore expect |E 2m+1 | = |O 2m+1 |.
To infer the embedding rate, α = 2p, we must consider the inverse of Eq. (5) since the stego image only gives us access to the primed quantities,
Under the assumption |E 2m+1 | = |O 2m+1 |, we obtain the quadratic expression,
There is an equation like this for each m, and to obtain α one option is to sum them all together and solve the resultant single quadratic equation. Alternatively, the least squares method of [47] can be used to estimate the value of α that minimizes the sum of the squared errors,
Because this second approach generalizes well to alternative cover assumptions that we will be making, we adopt the least squares approach in this study.
Sample pairs analysis using least squares optimization has proven quite successful at detecting embedding rates as low as 5% [47] , and the additional optimizations of [6] have achieved rates as low as 3% [7] . But, it is possible to do better by considering the higher-order statistics of larger sets of pixels.
C. Higher-order Attacks
Ker [7] has developed a generalized approach for analyzing n-tuples of pixels; specifically, he explored whether the cardinalities of sets of triplets of consecutive pixels, (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), can reveal LSB embedding. Trace sets are defined in this case as
with subsets
. At higher-order, there are more symmetries to exploit for detection: there is the analog of the SPA parity symmetry, |E 2m+1,2n+1 | = |O 2m+1,2n+1 |, the order symmetry, |E m,n | = |E n,m | for each m, n (and likewise |O m,n | = |O n,m |), and also a reflectional symmetry that relates sets under the transformation (m, n) → (−n, −m). In [7] , only the parity symmetry is considered which leads to a cubic analog of Eq. (9) in terms of the variable q = 1/(1 − 2p). This method, called Triples analysis, has some interesting properties: it performs rather unpredictably against stego images with high embedding rates ( 50%), but does well for lower rates. It showed to be slightly more sensitive than RS and SPA, detecting embedding rates as low as 4% and with a lower false alarm rate for uncompressed images; it did remarkably better than these lower-order techniques against JPEG-compressed images.
Finally, an analysis of quadruples was also studied [41] . The cover image symmetries considered were the analog parity symmetry, the inversion symmetry |E m,n,o | = |O −m,−n,−o |, and the permutative symmetry |E m,n,o | = |E π(m,n,o) | for any permutation, π. Each of these symmetries provides a separate estimate of the change rate, p, via a quartic polynomial in q = 1/(1 − 2p). These equations have multiple roots and it is not clear which one to choose as the best estimate for p: in [41] , Ker suggests selecting the root closest to a prior estimate of p from SPA or Triples analysis. When this can be done, the quadruples detector appears to be mostly consistent with lower-order tests.
IV. COVER MODIFICATIONS TO DEFEAT SPA
Sample pairs analysis is premised on the key assumption that natural images should satisfy the constraint |E 2m+1 | ≈ |O 2m+1 |. Certainly there are exceptions, but a decade's worth [40] , and we review it here in our own notation. Hereafter, we refer to the practice of altering cover image statistics prior to applying steganography as cover modification. Schematically, LSB embedding transforms a cover image, I, into a stego image, I , as I = L · I. The basic idea is to come up with a transformation, T , such that I = LT · I = I. While the pixel-wise act of embedding into LSB's cannot be inverted, we can invert the effects of LSB embedding on trace subset cardinality. The desired transformation has already been written down: it is the matrix in Eq. (8) . Here, though, we wish to apply this transformation not to the stego image trace sets, but the cover image sets,
giving us modified trace sets, C M m . The effect on the m = 1 trace subsets of a sample cover image is shown in Figure 2 . Because O 1 is larger than E 3 , Figure 2 (left), there is a net transfer of pairs from O 1 to E 3 after LSB embedding (right). But, if we anticipate these transitions by preemtively moving pairs from E 3 to O 1 prior to embedding, the stego image will exhibit the same statistics as the original cover, that is, the set cardinalities of trace subsets should be approximately equal (compare the black "original cover" in Figure 2 (left) with the red "stego modified cover" on the right). Sets like E 3 from which pairs must be moved to other sets during cover modification are called donor subsets.
The more data we wish to embed into the cover image, the more pairs need to be moved out of donor subsets. Since the donor subsets are of finite cardinality, there is a limit to the embedding capacity that depends on the particular cover image. Each trace set, C m , will have at least one donor subset, and the amount of data that can be embedded into pairs belonging to that trace set is constrained by the subset that empties at the smallest α. In practice, to find this α we solve each equation of Eq. (13) separately with the left-handside set to zero (corresponding to an empty subset in the modified cover) and pick the smallest α. Call this α m , the smallest embedding capacity allowed by trace set C m . Then, the maximum embedding capacity allowed for the image is the minimum capacity of all trace sets, α = min{α m }.
The number of trace sets to modify is arbitrary, though good results are obtained for −5 ≤ m ≤ 5. This is the same range of sets found in [7] and [47] to provide reliable detections, as higher-order trace sets tend to become sparsely populated and do not reliably satisfy the condition |E 2m+1 | = |O 2m+1 |. Even within the lower-order sets, it might occur that one or a few trace sets severely constrain α such that their omission from embedding results in a higher embedding capacity. As an extreme example, if a single donor set is already empty in any of the trace sets, the image cannot be embedded at all unless the pixels in this trace set are excluded from the embedding. This is very uncommon for pairs analysis, though becomes more of a problem with higher-order cover modifications as we will see. We therefore propose the following rule for identifying the maximum embedding capacity: set α = αm, where,m
where N is the total number of pixels in the image. We exclude all trace sets C i with α i < αm from the LSB embedding process. The quantity α = αm is the effective maximum embedding rate that results after these trace sets have been excluded.
In any case, once the value of α has been obtained, we are ready to perform the cover modification. This is just a redistribution of pairs among the trace subsets according to Eq. (13) with the chosen embedding rate, α. The appropriate number of pairs are moved out of each donor subset into nondonor subsets according to their deficits. For color images, trace sets are adjusted separately for each color channel.
This kind of cover modification has been shown to be quite effective at evading SPA [40] , but what about higherorder attacks? How does redistributing pixel pairs in this way affect the distribution of triplets? We perform a test on 1000 512x512 images from the BOSS database 3 of uncompressed, grayscale raster images. LSB steganography was performed by embedding a pseudo-random bit stream, simulating an 3 http://agents.fel.cvut.cz/boss/ encrypted message, into pseudo-randomly selected LSBs at the embedding capacity of each image. We present results in Figure 3 : black points are the detected embedding rates using SPA, and the red squares are those using Triples. The horizontal lines mark the 95% confidence bounds for a detection with SPA (black) or Triples (red) 4 . Negative embedding rates are of course not possible, and are simply how these algorithms interpret certain set imbalances. But, since negative α below the lower confidence bound might suggest that the image has been tampered with, such predictions can be considered detections. Points that fall on the diagonal are perfect predictions of the true rate. Only cover images that are below the SPA detection threshold were selected for cover modification.
The Triples analysis of [7] is able to detect the presence of a hidden message in almost every image, and estimate its length to within 50% accuracy for most. The noisiness observed in the Triples detections at high embedding rate possibly arises from the same instability observed by Ker in [7] . And so, perhaps unsurprisingly, a second-order cover modification is insufficient for securing LSB embedding against higher-order structural attacks. V. COVER MODIFICATIONS TO DEFEAT BOTH SPA AND TRIPLES To understand why the second-order cover modification did not also provide third-order protections, consider two consecutive triplets, m1 m3 m5
where the m i = x i+1 − x i denote the differences of the indicated pixel values. The pairs in this sextuplet belong to the trace sets C m1 , C m3 , and C m5 . Embedding into this sextuplet will in general transform all the m i → m i ; however, cover modifications based on pairs will only adjust pixels according to the transitions with i = 1, 3, 5. But pixel x 3 also belongs to the first triplet, and so helps determine m 2 , while pixel x 4 belongs to the second triplet and helps determine m 4 . If pixel x 3 is adjusted during cover modification according only to m 3 , as would happen under a second-order cover modification, the effect on m 2 will be essentially random, and likewise for the effect on m 4 of adjusting x 4 . It would appear that in order to preserve both second-and third-order statistics after LSB embedding, we must make cover modifications at sixth-order, in terms of sextuplets 5 .
A. Attempt at a full sixth-order solution
In [7] , Ker developed an approach to structural steganalysis to arbitrary order, which we apply here. Trace sets carry five indices denoting the differences between consecutive pixels in the sextuplet, (17) and the subsets are defined analogously to the triplets case,
There are 64 subsets in each C m1,...,m5 that can enumerated as follows [7] : first, write A 0,m1,...,m5 for E m1,...,m5 and A 1,m1,...,m5 for O m1,...,m5 . Writing the concatenation of two sequences s and t as s.t, the trace subsets of C t.k can be obtained recursively from the subsets A s1 ...A sn of C t as
where β i = 0 if i s i is even and β i = −1 if the sum is odd. Writing P (A si , A sj ) for the transition probability between the two subsets A si and A sj we have
Finally, the transition matrices can be obtained recursively from lower-order matrices via the g-fold Kronecker products,
and similarly for the inverses,
With so many more subsets per trace set at sixth-order, there is a real danger that we will encounter trace sets with at least one empty subset, preventing us from embedding into that trace set. To find out, we test this cover modification on 1000 uncompressed grayscale raster images (512x512 PGM format from the BOSS database cited earlier) and 1000 uncompressed color raster images (high-resolution TIF format from the USDA NRCS archive 6 resized to 640x450). Indeed, all of the trace sets in 20% of the grayscale and 50% of the color images had at least one empty subset, with the result that these images could not be modified and so could not serve as covers. The remaining images in each data set overwhelmingly contained only a single trace set with no empty subsets (typically C 0,0,0,0,0 ), with a resulting very low embedding capacity: 0.01% and 0.02% for grayscale and color, respectively. Evidently, a full sixth-order cover modification can only be done at the expense of a virtually empty stego image.
B. Third-order solutions with partial embedding strategies
The problem with the sixth-order approach is that a single empty subset excludes all the pixels in its trace set. We cannot get rid of empty subsets because they are a property of the cover image which we intend to preserve; but, we can mitigate the collateral damage their exclusion has on other subsets. One idea is to reduce the sizes of the trace sets so that the number of pixels that must be omitted from embedding is smaller in the event that the trace set contains an empty subset. One way to reduce the number of subsets per trace set is to reduce the dimensionality of the transformation: while we are stuck preserving sixth-order statistics, we are not actually stuck with the sixth-order transformation, T 6 , and the corresponding large 64-dimensional trace sets. At the start of this section, we argued that the trouble with modifying second-or third-order statistics such that the other is also preserved lies in the middle pair, (x 4 , x 5 ), of the sextuplet Eq. (16). To accommodate these pixels, we were forced to consider the sixth-order statistics of the cover, which we've just seen is not possible. Alternatively, we can simply omit these pixels from the embedding,
Then, m 1 and m 2 transform solely due to changes to pixels x 1 and x 2 , and m 4 and m 5 solely to changes to pixels x 5 and x 6 . The middle index m 3 is left unchanged. Cover modification can be done on triplets, and since only pairs that are fully inside triplets are embedded, these modifications will work to preserve second-order statistics as well. In this way, we break the sixth-order problem up into two separate third-order problems.
Since only two pixels in each triplet are ever embedded, each triplet undergoes a second-order transformation governed by T 2 of Eq. (5). The first triplet belongs to either the
and so the original 64-dimensional, sixth-order transition matrix decomposes as
The four-dimensional trace sets are smaller and so the damage incurred from empty subsets is better contained. Subsets are also much less likely to be empty in the first place since they are larger and more inclusive. The cost is that we must exclude 1/3 of the image pixels from the embedding process 7 .
To perform this cover modification, we consider sets with −5 ≤ m, n ≤ 5. The first triplet in each sextuplet is placed into the set called P 1 and the second into the set called P 2 . The maximum embedding capacity is determined by applying Eq. (15) to P 1 and P 2 separately, and the smaller of the 7 We also considered the strategy of omitting the four middle pixels from Eq. (16) , which, on its face would seem worse since twice as many pixels are excluded at the outset. But, the trace sets are even smaller in this case and the subsets even more general, and so the maximum α could be large enough to compensate for the loss of pixels. The LSB embedding transformation is composed of two separate families of single-pixel transformations on triplets: 
so that each of the eight trace sets are acted on by T 1 . In comparison with the strategy in the body, though α tends to be larger for the image types tested, it does not offset the reduction in capacity from discarding the additional 1/3 of pixels.
two is selected. For almost all images, there were several omitted trace sets; all included trace subsets were then adjusted according to the method outlined in Section IV. We test the effectiveness of this cover modification against SPA and Triples analysis for the three image data sets: uncompressed grayscale, uncompressed color, and JPEG-compressed color raster images (jpg format from the NRCS archive resized to 640x450 and converted to bitmaps). Only cover images that were consistent with zero embedding at 95% CL according to both detectors were selected for testing. Some images nonetheless still lead to detections at this threshold, and so for these we tuned the embedding rate down until it was no longer detected by either attack. The distribution of maximum embedding rates that escape both SPA and Triples detections are shown in Figure 4 for uncompressed grayscale images (a) and uncompressed color images (b). Both images formats support undetectable embedding rates between around 0.05-0.25 bits per channel (bpc), with an average of 0.12 bpc for grayscale and 0.17 bpc for color. For JPEG-compressed images, we find that larger embedding rates are possible, with a range of 0.05-0.40 bpc, and an average of 0.21 bpc, Figure 4 (c). This result is especially of interest since Triples analysis has shown to be much more reliable than pairs analysis at both detecting messages and estimating their length in JPEG-compressed covers, making it the last line of defense against these image types. Cover modifications that resist these attacks at moderate embedding capacities might therefore be of considerable value.
Before closing this section, we note that since first-order statistics, namely the quantities characterizing the distribution of single pixel values, are not adjusted during cover modification, the pixel value histogram will reflect LSB embedding. However, the χ 2 inference used to detect LSB embedding is not discriminating for randomly embedded messages with the relatively low embedding rates possible with cover modification at this order.
C. Message Embedding and Extraction
Since messages are embedded in the LSBs of image pixels, message extraction is a simple matter of reading off the LSBs of message-carrying bits. This is in contrast to some of the other methods used to defeat SPA, like the inverse histogram transformation of [35] that must be applied to the image before bits can be read off. Here, it is assumed that the recipient knows the partial embedding strategy, and so only extracts LSBs of pixels x 1 , x 2 , x 5 , and x 6 from each sextuplet. As is standard, the recipient needs a secret key to identify the pseudo-random path of pixels chosen for embedding. Here, however, the recipient must also know which pixels have been omitted from the embedding process so that they can be ignored during message extraction to avoid errors.
One way of dealing with this is to provide the recipient with a list of the omitted trace sets. For −5 ≤ m, n ≤ 5, this is a 2 × 11 2 = 242 bit data structure, where the factor of two arises from the two separate families of trace sets: those of triplets (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) and those of triplets (x 4 , x 5 , x 6 ). This structure can typically be compressed by a factor of 5 or so. If a covert channel exists between the sender and receiver, this data can be directly shared. A more convenient and practical solution is to embed it along with the message into the stego image. When the receiver extracts the message, it will contain point errors since all LSBs along the pseudo-random path, even those of omitted pixels, have been read off. As long as the list can be recovered without error, however, the recipient can then exclude the LSBs read from the omitted pixels and recover the original message. We now describe how this might be done in practice.
Since the embedded message will typically be encrypted, to prevent errors during decryption the LSBs of the omitted pixels should be encrypted along with the message bits. This can be done as follows: the sender computes a pseudo-random pixel path through the image, x N , including all pixels irrespective of whether they belong to an omitted set. Let m K be the string of length K of message bits to be embedded. Starting with m 0 , if x 0 is embeddable, then M 0 := m 0 , with M the master string to be embedded. If x 0 is not embeddable, we instead set M 0 to some arbitrary value, say M 0 := 1. The specific value is unimportant because this element is merely a placeholder so that encryption and decryption will be synchronized, as we will soon see. If the next pixel, x 1 , is embeddable, then M 1 := m 0 ; else, M 1 := 1. And so on in this way until we reach the end of m K . The master string will be of length K +N o , where N o is the number of omitted pixels in the pseudo-random path visited over the course of constructing M . The master string is then encrypted bit-wise, and the encrypted string, M , is embedded into the image as follows: if M i is a message bit, embed it into the LSB of x i ; otherwise, skip it and the pixel x i .
The message extracted by the receiver is the string M with the encrypted placeholders corresponding to the omitted pixels replaced by their plaintext LSBs (since these were skipped while embedding M ). From a cryptographic perspective, these flipped bits are transmission errors and they won't decrypt correctly. To ensure that these errors don't propagate to other bits, the cipher used to encrypt M must be synchronous. This way, the receiver can decrypt the extracted message with encryption errors corresponding only to the LSBs which are to be omitted anyway. The decrypted list can then be recovered and the LSBs of omitted pixels dropped to recover the original message, m K . This process is illustrated in Figure 5 . This approach only works if the path x N contains a contiguous block of around 50 embeddable pixels (to fit the 50 bit list without error). Even for the small 512x512 grayscale images considered in this study, such regions are plentiful with room to spare. The main drawback of the approach is that message extraction now requires more work: the recipient must assign each triplet to a trace set and then drop pixels belonging to omitted sets. Though this is computationally straightforward, it slightly mars the minimalism that makes LSB embedding so attractive.
VI. SECURITY AGAINST HIGHER-ORDER STRUCTURAL

ATTACKS
We have demonstrated that LSB embedding can be secured against second-and third-order structural attacks. But this raises the obvious question: is it susceptible to fourth-order attacks? In principle, yes. The quadruples analysis of [41] was shown generally effective but difficult to apply, owing to the uncertainty over which root of the quartic polynomial for q to select as the predicted change rate. Ker suggests selecting the root closest to the estimate from a prior detection using SPA or Triples; however, these methods fail to detect any embedded message for covers modified according to Section V. It is therefore unclear how quadruples analysis could be applied in practice against these kinds of stego images.
An extension of this methodology to provide fourth-order protections is possible, but we find that embedding capacities are close to zero. This is due to two factors: the loss of available pixels from the embedding strategy, and the limits imposed by donor set cardinality during cover modification. The embedding strategy is necessary since to preserve all statistics up to fourth-order, one needs to work with 4×3 = 12tuples of pixels and these large trace sets are almost guaranteed too all have at least one empty subset (easily as big a problem as with the sixth-order cover modification seen earlier). The embedding strategy is similar to that considered in Section V: at 12 th -order, there are no pairs straddling quadruples as there were at third-order (the "middle pair"), but there are triplets which would need to be omitted from the embedding for the same reasons, (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 |x 5 , x 6 , x 7 , x 8 |x 9 , x 10 , x 11 , x 12 ).
This strategy reduces the number of available pixels to 6/12 = 1/2 the total. Average embedding capacities for a fourthorder cover modification are around 8% of embeddable pixels, giving a total capacity for the image of around 4%. This is likely too low to be of any practical use. In general, the order of the cover modification is the least common multiple of all relevant orders whose statistics are to be preserved. Let the highest-order preserved statistic be k, and let the least common multiple be n. Then, only k/2 +1 pixels in the first and last k-tuples in each n-tuple are embeddable (all the others belonging to tuples that straddle the interior ktuples.) The result is that only the fraction 2×( k/2 +1)/n are embeddable pixels for a general n th -order cover modification. For k = 5, this fraction is 1/10 and so on average overall embedding capacities are less than 1%. We conclude from this that practical protection against structural steganalysis via cover modification does not extend beyond k = 3.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work has explored the extent to which LSB embedding can be made secure against structural steganalysis by modifying consecutive pixel count statistics of cover images prior to message embedding. It is observed that modifications to protect against structural steganalysis at a particular order do not secure LSB embedding against higher-order attacks. Given the effectiveness of the third-order Triples analysis of [7] at detecting moderate LSB embedding rates, particularly against JPEG-compressed images, we sought in this research to develop a cover modification that would be protective against both Sample Pairs and Triples analyses.
We found that the sixth-order cover modification necessary to preserve both the second-and third-order cover statistics targeted by Sample Pairs and Triples analyses resulted in virtually zero embedding capacity. This is because the large, 64-dimensional trace sets overwhelmingly tend to have at least one empty subset, preventing the redistribution of sextuplets within that trace set. We therefore considered instead reverting to a third-order cover modification, but only embedding into certain pixels so that both second-and third-order statistics would be preserved. Specifically, if all but the middle two pixels in each sextuplet are available for embedding, redistribution of pixel triplets also preserves second-order statistics and moderate embedding rates can be achieved. We find that for uncompressed color and grayscale raster images, undetectable embedding rates range from around 0.05-0.30 bpc, with an average of 0.12 bpc and 0.17 bpc, respectively. For JPEG-compressed color images, we find generally higher undetectable payloads upwards to 0.40 bpc, with an average of 0.21 bpc. Since Triples analysis has shown to be superior to SPA at detecting the presence of messages and estimating their length in JPEG-compressed images [7] , cover modifications that can defeat Triples are especially salient for this image type.
We also conclude that cover modifications performed at higher than third order result in virtually zero embedding capacity, and so protections cannot be extended beyond Triples analysis. This finding suggests that quadruples and even higher-order structural steganalysis should continue to be matured and developed in the face of these kinds of cover modifications.
Though accurate and powerful, structural steganalysis is not the only attack against LSB embedding. For example, the weighted stego-image [12] , [13] and asymptotic uniform most powerful (AUMP) [10] tests are robust detectors of LSB embedding that operate according to different principles, and so are not defeated with these kinds of cover modifications.
It is an open question whether the cover statistics targeted by structural steganalysis can be modified while also preserving the cover models exploited by weighted stego-image and AUMP steganalysis. Our approach might also be extended to secure against more general pixel grouping geometries like those explored in the Closure of Sets work of [48] , [49] .
Lastly, a nagging shortcoming of this methodology is the need to omit the pixels of entire trace sets in order to increase the maximum embedding rate. This requires that the recipient perform the additional work of identifying and removing the LSBs of the omitted pixels from the extracted data before a meaningful message can be recovered. Further, of course, having these pixels available for embedding in the first place would considerably increase the embedding capacity in many cases. Future work could explore cover pre-processing (prior to the modifications studied here) that redistributes pixels in trace sets with small (and, hence, limiting) donor subsets; such transfers, however, would not be reversed in the course of LSB embedding and so would stand as permanent modifications to the cover image. Such alterations would need to be performed carefully to avoid the introduction of statistical artifacts, and hence warrant further study.
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